Proximate cause includes both cause in fact and legal cause.[1] A cause in fact is a cause but for which the accident would not have happened.[2] A legal cause is a cause in fact that warrants legal liability as a matter of social policy.[3]

A cause is “proximate” only if it is both a cause in fact and a legal cause because not all causes in fact warrant the imposition of legal liability.

‘[B]ut for’ is rarely an adequate notion of cause. We do not say that since, in all probability, [plaintiff] would not have had an accident on I-70 if Columbus had not discovered America, Columbus caused the accident.[4]

If we were historians of technology we might attribute [plaintiff's] accident to the inventor of the internal combustion engine.[5]

Channel v. Mills

So, for example, speeding is not a proximate cause of a collision if it does no more than bring the favored and disfavored drivers to the same location at the same time, but it is a proximate cause where it prevents or retards the operator from slowing down, stopping, or otherwise controlling the vehicle so as to avoid a collision.

This is a short summary of the legal concept of proximate causation. For advice about your circumstances consult with an injury attorney.

[2] Id., citing Christen, at 507; Baughn, at 142.

[3] Id., citing Hartley, at 779; King v. Seattle, at 250 (quoting 1 T. Street, Foundations of Legal Liability 100, 110 (1906)); Prosser, at 244.

[4] Id., citing Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 191 Pa. 345, 43 Atl. 240 (1899); Central of Georgia Ry. v. Price, 106 Ga. 176, 32 S.E. 77 (1898).

[5] Id., citing Milam v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1992).