Our law firm was not involved in the personal injury lawsuit described in this article.
The Washington Court of Appeals ruled on a case in which it was alleged that an oil slick from a truck on the interstate highway caused a vehicle to loose control and leave the highway, rolling over several times.[1]
A truck driver for an oil company drove northbound for several miles on Interstate-5 before noticing that a suction hose had broken loose from its compartment and dragged on the ground behind the truck. At the time, a motorist driving on I-5 with her two children in the backseat hit a “slick” area and began “sliding all over the freeway”, lost control, and slid off a steep embankment and rolled three or four times causing injuries.
The motorist filed a complaint in Pierce County Superior Court asserting a claim of negligence against the petroleum company and the driver requesting damages for past and future medical expenses, lost earnings, physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future physical disabilities, loss of capacity to enjoy life, prejudgment interest, and “all items of special damages.”
Each party moved for summary judgment.The defendants conceded for purposes of the summary judgment motion that residual oil in the suction hose spilled onto the pavement, causing the accident. They argued, however, that they had not violated the duty of care because the driver acted reasonably by fully inspecting his vehicle before leaving the truck yard and by “specifically inspect[ing] the tie-downs to see that the hoses were secure.”
The trial court negligence ruled that “this is a classic case of negligence on the part of the defendant, and I will grant the motion for summary judgment on the basis of common law negligence . . . . And based on the fact that there is no dispute in regards to the reasonableness of medical costs, lost wages, et cetera, I will also grant judgment on that issue as well, but obviously the issue of general damages is still a matter for trial”.
A jury trial on damages followed. In addition to the trial court’s award of past medical billings, lost wages and out-of-pocket expenses, the jury entered a verdict awarding damages for future chiropractic care, future economic damages, and non-economic damages. The trial court entered a final judgment of $547,665.40.
The defendants asked the Washington Court of Appeals to vacate the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment and to remand for a new trial. They argued that the trial court erred in ruling that they were negligent as a matter of law because (1) genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether they breached a duty of care and, if so, whether that breach proximately caused the accident; and (2) the injury victim failed to satisfy the elements of res ipsa loquitur.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred by finding that the defendants breached the duty of ordinary care as a matter of law.
The defendants had presented evidence that the hose was appropriately secured upon departure and that—along with road conditions—a ruptured tie-down caused the hose to become loose. The Court ruled that because reasonable minds might differ as to whether the defendants breached their duty of care by failing to properly maintain, inspect, or anticipate the tie-down’s rupture, the trier of fact is better situated to make this determination and the defendant were not negligent as a matter of law.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or “the thing speaks for itself,” allows the jury to infer negligence when (1) the accident or occurrence producing the injury is of a kind which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of someone’s negligence, (2) the injuries are caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3) the injury-causing accident or occurrence is not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.[2]
The Court of Appeals ruled that as with the issue of negligence, the evidence of a broken tiedown prevents judgment based on res ipsa loquitur because defendants offered evidence of a nonnegligent cause of the broken tie-down.
The Court reversed and remanded for trial.
[1] Mattson v. American Petroleum Environmental Services, 37498-6-II, unpublished(April 13, 2010).
[2] Pacheco v. Ames, 149 Wn.2d 431, 436-37, 69 P.3d 324 (2003) (quoting Zukowsky v. Brown, 79 Wn.2d 586, 593, 488 P.2d 269 (1971)); Morner v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 31 Wn.2d 282, 290, 196 P.2d 744 (1948).